
# Anomaly Detection using Knowledge Graphs and Synergistic Reasoning

EGC HYNSIC 2025

Lionel TAILHARDAT
lionel.tailhardat@orange.com
https://genears.github.io/



# Back to the future



I expect my inference system to be tractable, logical, accurate, capable of generalizing when needed, and fast.

 $\mathcal{E} \xrightarrow{e.t.l.} \mathcal{K}^{\circlearrowleft^r} \xrightarrow{infer.} \mathcal{P}$ Options for supervision

circa 2020

& incident management,

#### Expert systems

$$\{e_1,\cdots,e_n\} \models p$$

Glass-box (logical, deterministic) Numerous false negatives Difficult to produce and maintain rules

Towards NeSys ?---- logic-N

#### Machine learning, neural networks

$$p \sim r([e_1, \cdots, e_n])$$

Closed-box (contrary to regulations)
Numerous false positives
Allows approximate reasoning (generalization)

B. Goertzel, et al. Engineering General Intelligence, Part 1. Atlantis Press Paris, 2014

Communications Technology

S. Mallat. L'apprentissage face à la malédiction de la grande dimension. Collège de France, 2017

Better understanding NNs to bring logic into them

# **Building bridges,** exploring possibilities


$$\{e_1, \dots, e_n\} \models p$$

$$p \sim r([e_1, \dots, e_n])$$

$$L \equiv C \land P_i \to G\langle p \rangle$$

Business rules and induction techniques... a possible synergy?

Intermediary steps / findings are required!



https://theses.fr/2024SORUS293

# Networks and us

Today, Alice's FluffyChat messenger cannot reach Bob's and Charlie's ...


... who's to blame?

- Wrong action
- Bug in the Matrix protocol
- Spontaneous network fault
- Cyberattack

Let's ask Susie, a network & security supervision expert ...

# **Networks** and us


The network is more complex than we may think, from both a structural, functional, and dynamic perspectives ...



... we must have a bird's eye view for situation understanding, and selecting the appropriate **procedure** to solve the issue.

# **Networks** and us

A single bird cannot grasp everything due to the coexistence and interplay of multiple ...



Trend analysis and change point detection in a time series.



Organizations and operator profiles

Different vocabularies and methods.

detection in parsed logs.


Observability issues.

Technologies, device manufacturers, configurations, and monitoring systems Heterogeneity in knowledge representations and semantics of phenomena.

Limited decision support code reuse and inference aggregation.

# Networks and us


Could therefore be interesting to have a unified view of the assets by handling heterogeneous data...



... and also of their global behavior!

# Networks and us

... which could help us fully capture an reason about an incident context, including its internal logic.



Anomal Detection (AD) and Root Cause Analysis (RCA) of complex situations Increase in operational efficiency. Lower cognitive effort.

Improving the design of ICT systems Knowledge capitalization on the systems behaviors. Knowledge sharing across operators and designers.

# **Research Questions**


How to define an anomaly model in a dynamic technical environment with various interdependencies, and what form should this model take to be shareable among practitioners and directly usable in anomaly detection tools and decision support systems?



Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data What is an adequate neuro-symbolic Al architecture that can learn logically-constrained behavioral rules from events and topology data of an ICT system, and enable to detect and interpret complex anomalous technical or user-based situations?

Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge
Can human operators and decision support AI agents use the same
Knowledge Representation (KR) of ICT systems for anomaly
detection and knowledge management, that KR being subject to
computation efficiency and interpretability?






RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

# **Building a graph for dynamic ICT systems**

Part






RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge


### **Knowledge Graphs?**


Enable data analysis and inference techniques to reason about the context of represented objects while handling heterogeneous data.




### **Knowledge Graphs?**


Enable data analysis and inference techniques to represented objects while handling heterogeneous data.










- « Which entity (resource/application/site) is concerned by a given incident? » (CQ1)
- « What was the root cause of the incident? » (CQ11)
- « What is the financial cost of this incident if it occurs? » (CQ23)
- « What are the vulnerabilities and the associated risk levels of this infrastructure? » (CQ25)
  - L. Tailhardat et al. NORIA-O: An Ontology for Anomaly Detection and Incident Management in ICT Systems. ESWC'24.







# **An ontology for Dynamic ICT systems**





**An ontology for Dynamic ICT systems** Alice's computer, the server used to bot:Space Structural noria:Class reach Bob and Charlie, etc. seas:CommunicationConnection NetworkInterface Room ora:classification pep:ProcedureE bot:containsZone NetworkLink \_\_networkLinkType \_\_\_\_ resourceManagedBy-WDM A document to follow-up on the networkLinkTerminationResource The instant messaging service for resource incident « Alice's computer cannot Alice to reach out to Bob and Charlie. reach Bob's and Charlie's » Functional resourceManagedBy dcterms:isPartO 2022-02-12T23:00:00Z Service elementManagedBy org:OrganizationalUnit Route flap TroubleTicket failure troubleTicketPriorit logOriginatingManagedC ChangeRequest application Module Of Expert knowledge for root cause **ApplicationModule** foaf:Person TroubleTicketNote analysis (RCA) and incident response. naf:holdsAccount Susie and other network CorporateUserIdentifie Procedural stakeholders. foaf:OnlineAccount DocumentAttachment PreCondition observable:UserAccour **ActionPostCondition** Trouble Analysis EventRecord pep:forPi -alarmProposedRepairAction Alarms and logs from the network that pep:Procedure reflect the impairment of the instant folio:ControlMethod

integrityViolation

**AnomalyPattern** 




messaging service.

evt:srv1-08212


user pid=1801 cmd res=success

folio:FailureMode

# An ontology for Dynamic ICT systems



An ontology for Dynamic ICT systems



#### Pattern analysis and translation Model-based detection (SPARQL) to Authoring Tests (ATs) + additional AD models 26 CQs 25 ATs (SPARQL) Ontology Ontology evaluation encodina NORIA-O RDFS/OWL data model Knowledge Graph Construction (KGC) pipeline engineering Knowledge Graph Data linking strategies rule set

#### Evaluation and Results =

#### **Authoring Tests for NORIA-O [RQ. 2]**

✓ 16/26 « OK » answered using a single or several simple SPARQL queries and the ontology.

"Which entity is concerned by a given incident?" (CQ1)

9/26 « Al » require the implementation of more complex Al-based algorithms such as anomaly detection algorithms.

"What was the root cause of the incident?" (CQ11) → the explicit representation of alarms and logs associated with a given incident is not enough and needs to be enhanced with root cause analysis algorithms.

"What are the vulnerabilities and the associated risk levels of this infrastructure?" (CQ25) → can be answered only by looking for non-desirable network topology shapes or relations to third-party cybersecurity vulnerability entities based on structure and security scanners.

1/26 « Extension » require the introduction of new concepts or relations via an extension of the NORIA-O model.

"What is the financial cost of this incident if it occurs?" (CQ23)

→ involves information about the cost of an incident.

RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data

RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

#### Pattern analysis and translation Model-based detection (SPARQL) to Authoring Tests (ATs) + additional AD models 26 CQs 25 ATs (SPARQL) Ontology Ontology evaluation encodina NORIA-O RDFS/OWI data model Knowledge Graph Construction (KGC) pipeline engineering Knowledge Graph Data linking rule set strategies

### **Evaluation and Results**

#### **Authoring Tests for NORIA-O [RQ. 2]**

✓ 16/26 « OK » answered using a single or several simple SPARQL queries and the ontology.

Ontologies bring **unified view of heterogeneous systems**, including
their dynamics, in line with the way
experts refer to their network.

cident?" (CQ1)

ore complex Al-based rithms.

?" (CQ11) → the associated with a

given incident is not enough and needs to be enhanced with root cause analysis algorithms.

"What are the vulnerabilities and the associated risk levels of this infrastructure?" (CQ25) → can be answered only by looking for non-desirable network topology shapes or relations to third-party cybersecurity vulnerability entities based on structure and security scanners.


✓ 1/26 « Extension » require the introduction of new concepts or relations via an extension of the NORIA-O model.

"What is the financial cost of this incident if it occurs?" (CQ23)


→ involves information about the cost of an incident.


RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data

RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge



















#### **Dump** RML rules for static data.




# **Mapping** data using RML rules produces triples.




#### **Inserting** the graph data.




**Mapping** data using RML rules for streamed data and **inserting** triples in the graph store.



# Using patching queries for **explicit linking** of entities.



#### Evaluation and Results 7



#### Data integration [RQ. 1 & RQ. 2]

**15 sources**, including streamed events spanning over 111 days.

- Events: trouble tickets (21 feat.), change tickets (11), alarm monitoring (8), logs monitoring (3).
- Descriptive: AAA groups (4 feat.), applications (15), teams (8), users (6), logistic database (19), backbone logical links (5), backbone physical links (4), application types (9), network topology (2), VM management (9), VM clusters (4).
- → 4M triples (400K+ entities, 21% event-related, 79% descriptive-related)
- ✔ Batch processing: performance ~ "map data" (w/o join),
- Stream processing: effective, load testing is needed to go further.

42 patching SPARQL queries

- 16 literal2SKOS,
- 19 literal2URI,
- 7 addShortcut.


RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data

RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

# **Exploiting the ICT systems knowledge**

Part II





RQ. 1 - Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

## A Cartography of Anomaly Detection Techniques

103 references analyzed: what are the approaches and data structures used, and when are these techniques applied in a business process?

Approach		System Design		ection & sification	Diagnostic Aid			
Rule-based	1	20,0 %	5	13,2 %	0	0,0 %		
Model checking	1	20,0 %	2	5,3 %	1	8,3 %		
Knowledge-based	2	40,0 %	6	15,8 %	6	<b>50,0</b> %		
Markov model	0	0,0 %	1	2,6 %	0	0,0 %		
Graph-based	1	20,0 %	10	26,3 %	5	41,7%		
ML-based	0	0,0 %	14	36,8 %	0	0,0 %		
Overall	5	9,1 %	38	69,1 %	12	21,8 %		

Akoglu et al. Graph-Based Anomaly Detection and Description: A Survey. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 2015.

Pang et al. **Deep Learning for Anomaly Detection: A Review**. ACM Computing Surveys, 2020.

He et al. A Survey on Automated Log Analysis for Reliability Engineering. ACM Computing Surveys, 2021.

González-Granadillo et al. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): Analysis, Trends, and Usage in Critical Infrastructures. Sensors, 2021.

## A Cartography of Anomaly Detection Techniques

103 references analyzed: what are the approaches and data structures used, and when are these techniques applied in a business process?

Graph-based approach in all three usage stages: a significant portion of the addressed problems involves the interconnected nature of the data.

Approach		System Design		ection & sification	Diagnostic Aid			
Rule-based	1	20,0 %	5	13,2 %	0	0,0 %		
Model checking	1	20,0 %	2	5,3 %	1	8,3 %		
Knowledge-based	2	40,0 %	6	15,8 %	6	<b>50,0</b> %		
Markov model	0	0,0 %	1	2,6 %	0	0,0 %		
Graph-based	1	20,0 %	10	26,3 %	5	41,7%		
ML-based	0	0,0 %	14	36,8 %	0	0,0 %		
Overall	5	9,1 %	38	69,1 %	12	21,8 %		

Prevalence of logic-based approaches in the design and diagnostic aid stages, as opposed to correlation-based approaches in the detection & classification stage.

#### 55/103 emerged with:

- Primary application domain close to the NetOps and SecOps fields,
- Practicality falling into an **incident management** stage.

Predominance of works applicable to the detection & classification stage.

## A Cartography of Anomaly Detection Techniques

103 references analyzed: what are the approaches and data structures used, and

when are these techniques applied in a business process?


	<b>-</b> Approach	S	System	Det	ection &	Diagnostic Aid		
Data structures	-npproach	l I	Design	Clas	sification			
Order relation, e.g. event logs & alarms, network	Rule-based		20,0 %	5	13,2 %	0	0,0 %	
traffic dump, temperature.	Model checking	1	20,0 %	2	5,3 %	1	8,3 %	
<b>Graph</b> (static or streaming), e.g. network topology.	Knowledge-based		40,0 %	6	15,8 %	6	50,0 %	
Tabular data, e.g. assets	Markov model	0	0,0 %	1	2,6 %	0	0,0 %	
with their characteristics.	Graph-based	1	20,0 %	10	26,3 %	5	41,7 %	
Multi-dimensional <b>data</b> points.	ML-based	0	0,0 %	14	36,8 %	0	0,0 %	
Mixed approaches, i.e.	Overall	5	9,1 %	38	69,1 %	12	21,8 %	

General tendency for detection & classification approaches to focus on the temporal evolution of systems, while diagnostic aid approaches tend to focus on a broader context of the system's state.

Challenges in Anomaly Detection (AD)

Potential difficulties in choosing algorithmic methods arise: they individually do not capture and analyze phenomena that involve **temporal**, **structural**, **logical**, and **probabilistic** aspects **simultaneously**.

structures.



**From logical to probabilistic**: the local network behavior knowledge serves as crisp foundation upon which we can build and combine, up to scale uncertainty and zero-shot diagnosis.

Susie analysing the situation:

- « Is there any pattern in a given set of logs/alarms? » (CQ 9)
- « Which sequence of events led to the incident? » (CQ 12)
- « What past incidents are similar to a given incident? » (CQ 14)

<AppDegraded>:TroubleTicket

Design choices for Al-based Anomaly Detection


- Logical vs probabilistic,
- Single inference model vs model stacking.

Why choose? Let's **combine techniques** to leverage their strengths, such as explainability and generalization, and achieve a **broader coverage of detection cases** compared to using a single model.

Design choices for cooperative decision-making: sequential and/or auto-organizing multi-agent decision-making.


#### Sequential model combination

An experimental plan that is easier to implement initially, allowing for control over the progression from logical to probabilistic, and limiting potential side effects caused by agent interactions that would necessitate evaluating non-monotonic reasoning, which is more laborious.



Busie analysing the situation:

- « Is there any pattern in a given set of logs/alarms? » (CQ 9)
- Which seguence of events led to the incident? » (CQ 1
- « What past incidents are similar to a given incident? » (CQ 14



<AppDegraded>:TroubleTicket

## **Model-Based Design**. Query the graph to retrieve anomalies and their context

- k out-of n devices with faults
- User with unusual account rights
- · Absence of traffic on an interface supposed to be active

The query (in SPARQL syntax) is implicitly **explainable**:

- Logic-based
- Reflects expert knowledge

<AppDegraded>:TroubleTicket

Knowledge mining: **query patterns can be extracted** from the database of operational support systems, up to expert validation. E.g. 12 SPARQL query patterns found by browsing the « incident description » field of a private dataset made of 139 noria: TroubleTicket entities.


L. Tailhardat et al. Leveraging Knowledge Graphs For Classifying Incident Situations in ICT Systems. ARES'23.

CONSTRUCT { WHERE (COUNT(DISTINCT ?ResImp) AS ?ResWithImpact) WHERE { # Get all resources participating in a given # application/service ... ?Res a noria:Resource : noria:resourceForApplication ?App . # Get resources with an alarm, if any ... OPTIONAL { ?Event a noria:EventLog; noria:eventLogOriginatingManagedObject ?Res BIND (?Res AS ?ResImp) } } # The k out-of n condition ... GROUP BY ?App

HAVING ( (?ResWithImpact / ?ResTotal) >= 0.5)

Susie analysing the situation:

- Is there any pattern in a given set of logs/alarms? » (CQ 9)
- « Which sequence of events led to the incident? » (CQ 12)
- « What past incidents are similar to a given incident?




**Model-Based Design**. Query the graph to retrieve anomalies and their context

- k out-of n devices with faults
- User with unusual account rights
- Absence of traffic on an interface supposed to be active

**Process mining**. Align a sequence of entities to activity models, then use this relatedness to quide the repair

- (EnergyLoss)=>(TimeoutAlert)=>(LossOfSignal)
- (LoginFail)=>(LoginFail)=>(LoginFail)



Procedural models, e.g. in Petri net form, are also implicitly **explainable**:

- Logic-based
- Reflect expert knowledge

<AppDegraded>:TroubleTicket


Model-Based Design. Query the retrieve anomalies and their con

- k out-of n devices with faults
- User with unusual account rights
- Absence of traffic on an interface suppose to be active

**Process mining**. Align a sequence of entities to activity models, then use this relatedness to quide the repair

(EnergyLoss)=>(TimeoutAlert)=>(LossOfSignal)

| Control | Control



Knowledge mining: procedural models can be extracted too, up to expert refinement and validation...

Susie analysing the situation:

- « Is there any pattern in a given set of logs/alarms? » (CQ 9)
- « Which sequence of events led to the incident? » (CQ 1)
- « What past incidents are similar to a given incident? » (CQ 14)

<AppDegraded>:TroubleTicket

**Model-Based Design**. Query the graph to retrieve anomalies and their context


- k out-of n devices with faults
- User with unusual account rights
- Absence of traffic on an interface supposed to be active

**Process mining**. Align a sequence of entities to activity models, then use this relatedness to guide the repair


- (EnergyLoss)=>(TimeoutAlert)=>(LossOfSignal)
- (LoginFail)=>(LoginFail)

**Statistical Learning**. Relate entities based on context similarities, then use this relatedness to alert and guide the repair

 The hidden cause of the trouble ticket on server 1 is a "data leak" attack that started on server 2



### **Statistical Learning**



#### Evaluation & results

Dataset from the knowledge graph construction pipeline:


- 15 sources → 4M triples (400K entities)
- 138 noria:TroubleTicket entities
- 5 target class (noria:troubleTicketCategory property)

#### Best model shows 0.81 F1 weighted score:


- Supervised learning, 75/25 % stratified fixed-split dataset
  - Interrupted service: 77 entities (55.8%), 0.97 w, F1
  - Degraded QoS: 22 (15.9%), 0.75
  - No service impact: 22 (15.9%), 0.62
  - Defect to be qualified: 13 (9.4%), 0.57
  - Equipment failure: 4 (2.9%), 0.00
- Embeddings with walk depth = 8, walk count = 30
- Random forest with max tree depth = 5, tree count = 20



### Statistical Learning -




### NORIA UI -



This is super cool, but **can we make it simple**, considering that I have Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to respect?


By « we », I mean incident managers, network supervision experts, cybersecurity analysts, system architects, etc.



#### UI/UX design (co-design with Orange operation experts)


- ✓ Development, deployment and evaluation of a Web-based client-server architecture leveraging a knowledge graph structured by NORIA-O.
- Principle: providing access to information about the network's life based on four complementary facets derived from the knowledge graph.
  - L. Tailhardat et al. NORIA UI: Efficient Incident Management on Large-Scale ICT Systems Represented as Knowledge Graphs. ARES'24.

### **Evaluation and Results**




#### Anomaly detection framework leveraging the synergistic reasoning principle [RQ. 1]

- Model-based: 2 SPARQL-based detection cases, 2 reasoning-based cases, and 12 query patterns.
- Process mining: 2 alignement-based detection cases and a Web extension to learn user-network behavioral models.
- Statistical learning: graph-embedding-based classifier achieving an interesting 0.81 F1 score as an initial attempt.



- UI/UX evaluation campaign: 1 month duration, 10 active beta testers, average SUS score = 68.4, correlation of the the respondents' profile with the acceptability level (from good to high).
  - L. Tailhardat et al. NORIA UI: Efficient Incident Management on Large-Scale ICT Systems Represented as Knowledge Graphs. ARES'24.
- RQ. 1 Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

### **Evaluation and Results**




contextual element for a second technique.

RQ. 2 - Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge


# **Anomaly Detection using Knowledge Graphs and Synergistic Reasoning**

Conclusion



## Research Summary -

- Holistic perspective on the application domain.
- Explicit representation of networks and their ecosystem.
- Algorithmic techniques heavily reliant on formal representation at the level of generated models or their results.



Process mining

#### Now in position to:


- Achieve cross technical domain anomaly detection with intrinsic explainability and probabilistic reasoning capabilities.
- Identify and share strengths and weaknesses of infrastructures (FMEA).
- RQ. 1 Anomaly model production & utilization with heterogeneous data
- RQ. 2 Constraints on the internal representation of data and knowledge

Statistical learning - Graph embedding

Reasoning



- Knowledge Graphs at the company scale.
- Neuro-symbolic multi-agent system for synergistic reasoning.
- Root cause analysis with graph generation and causal models
- Cybersecurity risk assessment and moving target defense.




55

### Future Work -

#### Towards new subjects:

- Knowledge Graphs at the company scale.
- Neuro-symbolic multi-agent system for synergistic reasoning.
- Root cause analysis with graph generation and causal models.
- Cybersecurity risk assessment and moving target defense.



How to select and ideally order each anomaly detection approach to ensure trustworthy decision-making?


## Closing Thoughts for HYNSIC 7

Current trends in NeSys and Knowledge Graphs (opinion)

- R&D professionals are primarily looking into loosely connected KG and NN parts.
- RDF/RDFS/OWL KG practitioners overlook automated reasoning, favoring heterogenous data management capabilities of the SemWeb stack.

Exploring the models

Pateut spaces



Monolitical musional NNs? Strong coupling Analytical approach

of NeSvs

of NeSys

challenge of a monolithic NeSys model, if that is indeed the goal to be achieved.

## **Additional materials**


Appendix



## Code and Dataset

- NORIA-O, an RDF data model for IT networks, events and operations information. https://w3id.org/noria
- **grlc**, a fork of CLARIAH/grlc with SPARQL UPDATE and GitLab interface features. https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/grlc
- SMASSIF-RML, a Semantic Web stream processing solution with declarative data mapping capability based on a
  modified version of the RMLMapper-java tool and extensions to the StreamingMASSIF framework.
  https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/SMASSIF-RML
- ssb-consum-up, a Kafka to SPARQL gateway enabling end-to-end Semantic Web data flow architecture with a Semantic Service Bus (SSB) approach. https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/ssb-consum-up
- SemNIDS, bringing semantics into Network Intrusion Detection Systems. https://github.com/D2KLab/SemNIDS
- **Dynagraph**, network dumping and Web app for live 3D graph rendering of streamed graph data derived from traces. https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/dynagraph
- **Graphameleon**, a Web extension that captures Web navigation traces and transforms them into a RDF graph for further exploration.
  - https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/graphameleon
- **Graphameleon dataset**, an RDF dataset of Web navigation traces, generated by the Graphameleon Web extension. https://github.com/Orange-OpenSource/graphameleon-ds
- LLM4KE, a dataset of RDF data models, and code for generating competency questions. https://github.com/D2KLab/llm4ke

## **ICT System State Transition Model**



The representation of a network can be divided into four facets: **structural**, **functional** (the blue path indicates an operational data flow, the red path a faulty flow), **dynamic**, and **procedural** (logged events are related to cyber-security attack tactics from the MITRE ATT&CK matrix). *Tau* stands for state transition, *O(t)* for observed state at time *t*, and *p* for state prediction.

### **Analysis of Semantic Models**

95 references analyzed: to what extent the set of models for each application domain theoretically aligns with the targeted discourse domain?

Theme	MC	St. %	Fu. %	Dy. %	Pr. %	F0 %	F1 %	F2 %	F3 %	F4 %
Generic	18	0,0	11,1	55,6	38,9	33,3	33,3	27,8	5,6	0,0
CyberSec	11	54,5	54,5	63,6	81,8	0,0	36,4	18,2	0,0	45,5
SE-SI	9	88,9	66,7	55,6	44,4	0,0	11,1	44,4	22,2	22,2
Net-IT	7	71,4	42,9	28,6	28,6	0,0	42,9	42,9	14,3	0,0
Process modeling	4	50,0	25,0	<b>75,0</b>	100,0	0,0	25,0	25,0	25,0	25,0
Health Science	1	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0
Overall	50	44,0	36,0	54,0	54,0	12,0	30,0	32,0	10,0	16,0

MC: model count; St.: structural, Fu.: functional, Dy.: dynamic, Pr.: procedural St.%, Fu.%, Dy.%, Pr.%: proportion of models for which the facet has been identified Fx%: expressiveness of the models by comparing the proportion of models that meet 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 facets.

<sup>🖒</sup> Vandenbussche et al. Linked Open Vocabularies (LOV): A Gateway to Reusable Semantic Vocabularies on the Web. SWJ, 2017.

Rivadeneira et al. Cybersecurity Ontologies: A Systematic Literature Review. ReCIBE, 2020.

Abu-Salih. **Domain-specific knowledge graphs: A survey**. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 2021.

Six primary application domains (theme), with varying proportions of available models and model characteristics...

## **Analysis of Semantic Models**

d: to what extent the set of models for each application digns with the targeted discourse domain?

Theme	MC	St. %	Fu. %	Dy. %	Pr. %	F0 %	F1 %	F2 %	F3 %	F4 %
Generic	18	0,0	11,1	55,6	38,9	33,3	33,3	27,8	5,6	0,0
CyberSec	11	54,5	54,5	63,6	81,8	0,0	36,4	18,2	0,0	45,5
SE-SI	9	88,9	66,7	55,6	44,4	0,0	11,1	44,4	22,2	22,2
Net-IT	7	71,4	42,9	28,6	28,6	0,0	42,9	42,9	14,3	0,0
Process modeling	4	50,0	25,0	<b>75,0</b>	100,0	0,0	25,0	25,0	25,0	25,0
Health Science	1	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0
Overall	50	44,0	36,0	54,0	54,0	12,0	30,0	32,0	10,0	16,0

50/95 with implementation based on Semantic Web technologies. The 45 others did not have an implementation.

del count : Ct : ctructural Fire functional Dy.: dynamic, Pr.: procedural ich the facet has been identified n of models that meet 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 facets.

### **Analysis of Semantic Models** '

95 references analyzed: to what e the domain theoretically aligns with the

Facet coverage varies across the different groups of models.

or each application

Low coupling between facets.

Theme	MC	St. %	Fu. %	Dy. %	Pr. %	F0 %	F1 %	F2 %	F3 %	F4 %
Generic	18	0,0	11,1	55,6	38,9	33,3	33,3	27,8	5,6	0,0
CyberSec	11	54,5	54,5	63,6	81,8	0,0	36,4	18,2	0,0	45,5
SE-SI	9	88,9	66,7	55,6	44,4	0,0	11,1	44,4	22,2	22,2
Net-IT	7	71,4	42,9	28,6	28,6	0,0	42,9	42,9	14,3	0,0
Process modeling	4	50,0	25,0	75,0	100,0	0,0	25,0	25,0	25,0	25,0
Health Science	1	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0	100,0	0,0	0,0
Overall	50	44,0	36,0	54,0	54,0	12,0	30,0	32,0	10,0	16,0

MC: model count; St.: structural, Fu.: functional, Dy.: dynamic, Pr.: procedural St.%, Fu.%, Dy.%, Pr.%: proportion of models for which the facet has been identified

Fx%: expressiveness of the models by comparing the proportion of models that meet 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 facets.

Challenges in Knowledge Representation & Reasoning (KRR)

Potential difficulties in precisely allowing for reasoning on the **interplay** between **network architecture** and its **operation**.

## NORIA-O Competency Questions 1/3

## The 26 NORIA-O competency questions, available at https://w3id.org/noria/cqs/

- 1. Which resource/application/site is concerned by a given incident?
- 2. What assets are shared by a given asset chain?
- 3. What logs and alarms are coming from a specified resource?
- 4. Which metrics are coming from a specified resource?
- 5. To which event family does this log belong and is this event normal or abnormal?
- 6. What events are associated with a given event?
- 7. Which agent/event/resource caused the event under analysis?
- 8. What do the various fields in the log refer to?
- 9. Is there any pattern in a given set of logs/alarms?
- 10. What interventions were carried out on this resource that could have caused the incident?
- 11. What was the root cause of the incident?
- 12. Which sequence of events led to the incident?
- 13.On which resource did this sequence of events take place and in which order?
- 14. What past incidents are similar to a given incident?

## The 26 NORIA-O competency questions, available at https://w3id.org/noria/cqs/

## NORIA-O Competency Questions 2/3

- 15. What operation plan (automation, operating procedures, etc.) could help us solve the incident?
- 16. What corrective actions have been carried out so far for a given incident?
- 17. What is the list of actions taken that led to the resolution of the incident?
- 18. Given all the corrective actions carried out so far for the incident, what assumptions covered the actions taken?
- 19. What has been the effect of the corrective actions taken so far for the incident?
- 20. Given all the corrective actions carried out so far for the incident, what possible actions could we still take?
- 21. What is the summary of this incident and its resolution?
- 22. Which agents were involved in the resolution of the incident?
- 23. What is the financial cost of this incident if it occurs?
- 24. How long before this incident is resolved?
- 25. What are the vulnerabilities and the associated risk levels of this infrastructure?
- 26. What is the most likely sequence of actions that would cause this infrastructure to fail?


## **NORIA-O Competency Questions 3/3**

NORIA-O competency questions for analyzing the conceptual facets coverage of data models

St.	Fu.	Dy.	Pr.	Competency Questions
<u>√</u> ✓ ✓	ru. ✓	<i>y</i> .	<b>√</b> ✓	What assets are shared by a given asset chain? Which entity (resource/application/site) is concerned by a given incident? On which resource did this sequence of events take place and in which order? What corrective actions have been carried out so far for a given incident (who, what, where)? What interventions were carried out on this resource that could have caused the incident? What operation plan (automations, operating procedures, etc.) could help us solve the incident? Given all the corrective actions carried out so far for the incident, what possible actions
			<b>√</b>	could we still take?

The four knowledge facets to represent (St.: structural, Fu.: functional, Dy.: dynamic, Pr.: procedural) map to a subset of NORIA-O competency questions.

### **NORIA-DI Evaluation and Results**



in terms of materialized concepts and entities to link them with. given the number of sources and their temporality.

This can be addressed by modeling the entire process in BPMN or

15 sources, including streamed events spanning over 111 days.

- Events: trouble tickets (21 feat.), change tickets (11), alarm monitoring (8), logs monitoring (3).
- Descriptive: AAA groups (4 feat.), applications (15), teams (8), users (6),
  - The RML rule set could also be used for post-analysis in data governance (e.g. reducing redundancies between data repositories).
- → 4M triples (400K+ entities, 21% event-related, 79% descriptive-related)
- Batch processing: performance ~ "map data" (w/o join),
- Stream processing: effective, load testing is needed to go further.

Declarative data transformation (RML rule set + patching queries + URI patterns in YAML syntax) allows anticipating the knowledge **graph structure**, thereby reducing the need for posterior data quality checks (e.g. no SHACL required).

16 literal 2SKOS,

- 19 literal2URI.
- addShortcut.

ıta ge

### KGC Dataset Example -

**JSON** "id": "TOY2022TT", "creationDateTime": "2022-04-26T11:58:00Z", "description": "Toy example: service access Failure from term1. Probable cause: network issue.", "detectionDateTime": "2022-04-26T11:58:00Z", "lastUpdate": "2022-04-26T12:07:00Z", "isNotificationEnable": false, "category": { "label": "Impaired service" }, "priority": { "label": "P2" }, "status": [ "code": "InProgress", "isCurrentStatus": true, "troubleTicketCharacteristic": [...], "note": [ "text": "Service access diagnosis: no route to srv1.", "recordingDate": "2022-04-26T12:05:00Z", "author": "LF001", "operationType": { "label": "Comment" } }, [...]

```
Turtle
<https://w3id.org/noria/document/TT TOY2022TT>
  a noria:TroubleTicket:
  dcterms:created "2022-04-26T12:00:00Z";
  dcterms:description """Toy example: service
   access failure from term1. Probable cause:
   Network issue."";
  dcterms:identifier "TOY2022TT":
  dcterms:modified "2022-04-26T12:07:00Z";
  dcterms:extent "P0Y0M0DT0H10M0S";
  noria:troubleTicketDetectionDateTime
    "2022-04-26T11:58:00Z";
  noria:troubleTicketRelatedResource
    <https://w3id.org/noria/object/RES TOY term1>;
  noria:troubleTicketStatusCurrent
    <https://w3id.org/noria/ontology/kos/</pre>
     TroubleTicket/status/current> :
  noria:documentStatusHistory
    <https://w3id.org/noria/event/</pre>
     LOG TOY TT TOY2022TT STATUS Current>;
  dcterms:hasPart
  <https://w3id.org/noria/document/</pre>
   TTN TOY2022TT 2022-04-26T12:05:00Z CU LF001>,
  <a href="https://w3id.org/noria/document/">https://w3id.org/noria/document/</a>
   TTN TOY2022TT 2022-04-26T12:07:00Z CU LF004>;
```

TroubleTicket (raw and Turtle syntax): excerpt from the NORIA-O dataset, available at <a href="https://w3id.org/noria/">https://w3id.org/noria/</a>

## List of use cases from expert panel interviews, in simplified form.

## **Incident Diagnosis**

## **Activity Cases**

- 1. Circumscribe assets and causes search space for multi-applications incident situations
- 2. Alert on impaired service situations occurring on (distributed) fail-over architectures
- 3. Assess legitimacy of a given network flow
- 4. Track single identity from a set of various activity traces
- 5. Analyze false-positive and recurrent cyber security alerts
- 6. Analyze compliance of web navigation traces from institutional website

## **Data Structures** and **Algorithmic Methods**

Approach	Seq	. data	Seq. data (network)	Time series		ordered (1,2,3)	G	raph		raph eams	Tab	ular		Data points		Mixed seq.+ graph		seq.+		seq.+		seq.+		seq.+		seq.+		xed q.+ ıb.		Mixed seq.+ unstr.		ixed 0,11)
		[%]	[%]	[%]	Σ	[%]		[%]		[%]		[%]		[%]		[%]		[%]		[%]	Σ	[%]										
									De	sign																						
Gbased		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0	1	10,0		0,0		0,0	1	8,3										
Kbased		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0	1	10,0	1	100,0		0,0	2	16,7										
M. check.	1	7,1	0,0	0,0	1	4,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
Rbased		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	1	9,1		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
								Detectio	on &	Classifi	cation	ı																				
Gbased	2	14,3	0,0	1 16,7	3	12,0	3	27,3	1	50,0	2	66,7		0,0	1	10,0		0,0		0,0	1	8,3										
Kbased	2	14,3	1 20,0	0,0	3	12,0	3	27,3		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
Markov	1	7,1	0,0	0,0	1	4,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
ML-based	5	35,7	1 20,0	5 <b>83,3</b>	11	44,0		0,0	1	50,0		0,0	2	100,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
M. check.	1	7,1	0,0	0,0	1	4,0	1	9,1		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
Rbased	1	7,1	3 <b>60,0</b>	0,0	4	16,0	1	9,1		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
								Di	agno	ostic Aid	1																					
Gbased		0,0	0,0	0,0	T	0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0	5	50,0		0,0		0,0	5	41,7										
Kbased		0,0	0,0	0,0		0,0	2	18,2		0,0	1	33,3		0,0	2	20,0		0,0	1	100,0	3	25,0										
M. check.	1	7,1	0,0	0,0	1	4,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0		0,0										
Overall	14	25,5	5 9,1	6 10,9	25	45,5	11	20,0	2	3,6	3	5,5	2	3,6	10	18,2	1	1,8	1	1,8	12	21,8										

Distribution (in number and proportion) of the main data structures used within the algorithmic solutions in the analyzed papers, based on the algorithmic approach family and the stage of the incident management process involved. Values in bold highlight the most representative approach for a given data structure. The columns in italics represent cumulative values (ordered = columns 1 + 2 + 3, mixed = columns 9 + 10 + 11) to provide a summary view of similar structures.

70

# **Anomaly Modeling Technique Families**

Principles	Strengths	Weaknesses			
	Model-Based Design				
Query the graph to retrieve anomalies and their context.	Detecting anomalies "recorded" some- how in the graph thanks to the alarm sys- tem; straightforward translation of sim- ple anomaly detection rules; multiple ab- straction levels (subsumption).	Relies on expert knowledge; lack probabilistic reasoning; hard to represent sequential decisions; may requite infer more prior information about the anomaly, e.g. its type using classification.			
	Process Mining				
Align a sequence of entities to activity models, then use this relatedness to guide the repair.	Detecting anomalies with multiple alert- ing signals and sequential decisions; re- playable models.	Relies on expert knowledge; may require denoising models; probabilistic relatedness.			
	Statistical Learning				
Relate entities based on context similarities, then use this relatedness to alert and guide the repair.	Detecting anomalies with multiple alerting signals.	Requires fine tuning of the context denition depending on use case and temporality requirements; probabilistic relatedness.			


### The solution-oriented bias

#### Need to learn (or deduce) what not to do


TroubleTicket database mining leads to learning a solutionto-undesirable-states-driven mapping function:

- Trouble Tickets primarily refer to an incident context and the remediation actions taken, rather than to instances when the network is behaving well.
- The solution-oriented data is an ill-situation for supervised Al approaches as they require to have evenly distributed class instances for proper classification tasks.

Tackling the solution-oriented bias involves counterfactual reasoning, i.e. reasoning on events that did not occur but that may have under defined conditions.




### **Process Mining**



- A Web extension for the live capture at the browser level of network requests & user
- interactions.
- Output of a RDF Knowledge Graph using the UCO ontology.
- Mining procedural models with process discovery techniques (PM4Py), and detecting anomalous behaviors with conformance checking techniques (PM4Py).
  - L. Tailhardat et al. Walks in Cyberspace: Improving Web Browsing and Network Activity Analysis with 3D Live Graph Rendering. TWC'22.
  - L. Tailhardat et al. Graphameleon: Relational Learning and Anomaly Detection on Web Navigation Traces Captured as Knowledge Graphs. TWC'24.
  - L. Tailhardat et al. Graphaméléon : apprentissage des relations et détection d'anomalies sur les traces de navigation Web capturées sous forme de graphes de connaissances. PFIA'24.


### **Process Mining**



### **Reasoning Services for Decision Support 1/2**

#### Stages of the incident management process where a recommendation system can be useful:


- 1. Before the ticket creation (early detection).
- 2. At the ticket opening (cause/solution similarity based on ticket descriptors and context),
- 3. During the resolution (cause/solution refinement and proposal of next action based on the actions taken).



# Reasoning Services for Decision Support 2/2

#### Reasoning services (proposal):


- 1. Predicting the category of a trouble ticket,
- 2. Predicting the probable cause of a trouble ticket,
- 3. Detecting anomalies before a trouble ticket is even created,
- 4. Adding comments to a given trouble ticket (e.g. next best action to undertake),
- 5. Calculate the n closest anomalies given an observed anomaly.



## Federating Partitioned Data


#### Federated queries for providing,


- A single protocol to access data silos using different storage technologies & formalisms,
- A unified representation of data domains with scoped access control.



## Scaling with Streams

- Building the graph with all incoming data.
- Building the graph with summarized data, and ensure unicity of object identifers across data stores.





# **Causal Graphs & Knowledge Graphs**


Place with marking at t0

(General case) **Discovering causal graphs** from samples derived from a causal model: need for independence tests between variables (require a large amount of data to be accurate).


(NORIA case) **Not a « blind discovery »**: we already have some edges in the graph (even if they are not directed) + we also have access to temporal information, which is highly useful in causality (causes precede effects).

Place with marking at t0+x

dependency relationships between the states of network entities through the graph representation of the network. 79



# **Graphical** Root Cause Analysis




A prototype of the graphical root cause analysis view obtained by **projecting the procedural model** from the process mining step **onto the entities in the NORIA UI notebook**. The circled nodes highlight the *noria:Resource* and the *noria:EventRecord* likely responsible for the incident. The dotted lines emphasize the temporal sequence.

## Time-Ordered Contact Map

Without prior knowledge of event sequences: **disambiguating events** for which the occurrence time is close or identical.

We assume that the mechanism of **fault propagation** on the network is a **function of the distance** to be traveled in terms of the number of **network hops**.



A toy example of a network topology with three events (triangular shapes with  $t1 \le t2 \le t3$ ). The heavy dashed arcs represent « followed by » relationships (bold numbers in eq.) The light dashed arc represents the **transitive cause-effect relationship** of the t1 event to the t2 event, based on the composition ( $t2 \rightarrow t3$ )  $\circ$  ( $t1 \rightarrow t2$ ).


# Similarity Graph from Embeddings

#### Algorithm 1 Similarity graph of entities embeddings


```
E \leftarrow embeddings entities
k \leftarrow number of entities for similarity
SG \leftarrow \emptyset
                                                                                 ► Empty graph
for all e \in E do
    SG \leftarrow e
                                                                                    ▶ Add vertex
    SIM \leftarrow MostSimilar_{cosine}(e, E, k)
                                                                  ▶ Similarity on embeddings
    for all e_{sim} \in SIM do
        SG \leftarrow e_{sim}
                                                                                    ▶ Add vertex
        SG \leftarrow (e, e_{sim})
                                                                                      ► Add edge
    end for
end for
SG \leftarrow P_{\text{Louvain modularity}}(SG)
                                                                           ▶ Node partitioning
SG \leftarrow R_{\text{Centrality}}(SG)
                                                                                 ▶ Node ranking
```

Graph vertex ≡ context vector for a given TroubleTicket entity

Graph edge ≡ « MostSimilar » relationship



### NORIA UI Architecture



## Thanks!

